The National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The Supreme Court\u27s Artful Yet Indecent Proposal by Heyman, Barry J.
NYLS Journal of Human Rights 
Volume 16 
Issue 1 SYMPOSIUM: WOMEN, EQUITY AND 
FEDERAL TAX POLICY: OPEN QUESTIONS 
Article 31 
1999 
The National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The Supreme 
Court's Artful Yet Indecent Proposal 
Barry J. Heyman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Heyman, Barry J. (1999) "The National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The Supreme Court's Artful Yet 
Indecent Proposal," NYLS Journal of Human Rights: Vol. 16 : Iss. 1 , Article 31. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol16/iss1/31 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
The National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The
Supreme Court's Artful Yet Indecent Proposal
INTRODUCTION
It is "the Supreme Court's obligation to maintain the Constitution as
something we the people can understand."1
The federal government has been financially aiding American
artists, organizations, and institutions through grants awarded by the
National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") since 1965.2 In 1990,
Congress mandated that the NEA take into consideration "general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the American public when awarding grants." 3 This provision, known
as the decency clause ("Decency Clause"), 4 became statutory criteria
for awarding federal grants to artists. As a result, four artist applicants
were denied funding. They subsequently contested the
constitutionality of the Decency Clause.5  Prior to the amended
statute, which included the Decency Clause, an advisory panel had
recommended approval of the applicants' art projects.6 However,
based on the passage of this clause, the panel subsequently
recommended disapproval, and funding was denied.7 The District
I JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT'S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE
CAN UNDERSTAND 109-133 (1992) (examining a variety of important constitutional law
cases to detail the problem with deciding cases ambiguously, with an emphasis on the
communicative style rather than the result; and suggesting ways in which opinions can be
written using simple and precise language while maintaining accuracy and fairness).
2 National Foundation of the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-209, § 4, 79 Stat. 845, 846 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
320 U.S.C. § 954(d) (Supp. IV 1994).
4 See infra note 45.
5See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1460
(C.D. Cal. 1992).
6 See id. at 1462; see also 20 U.S.C. § 955(f)(2) (1994). The NEA
Chairperson can veto Council recommendations but cannot fund projects not authorized
by both Peer Review Panels and the Council. See id
7See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1462; see also Patty Hartigan, Artists Lash Out
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Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.8  The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the amendment, on its face,
impermissibly discriminated on the basis of viewpoint 9 and was void
for vagueness under the First and Fifth Amendments.' 0 On June 25,
1998, the Supreme Court reversed, and ruled that the Government can
consider the "general standards of decency" when determining the
propriety of a NEA grant.
I
This Comment will argue that by upholding both the First
Amendment and the so-called "Decency Clause" in NEA v. Finley, the
Supreme Court failed to clarify the issues relating to funding, and
instead, perpetuated confusion in the decision-making process
regarding arts funding. This decision has thus hindered the
encouragement of artistic expression. Part I of this Comment will
discuss the historical background of the NEA that lead to its adoption
of the Decency Clause.' 2 Part II summarizes Finley as it progressed
from the district court to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and
finally to the Supreme Court.13  Part III discusses the key
constitutional issues and then expands upon how the Supreme Court
employed them. Part IV is a critical response to the Court's muddled
opinion. Part V examines the cumulative effects of the Court's
decision, and the on-going controversy as exemplified by two post-
Finley cases. Part VI concludes with a vision of arts funding that
at NEA, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 1990, at 74.
8 See id. at 1476.
9See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (holding that viewpoint
discrimination is a violation of the First Amendment where the government acts to
"proscribe speech...or expressive conduct...because of [a] disapproval of the ideas
expressed"). Government initiatives proscribing speech in such a discriminatory manner,
known as "content-based regulations," are deemed by the Supreme Court to be
presumptively invalid. Id.
10 See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 683-84
(1996); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall be
• . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. I (stating in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech").
II See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73
(1998).
12 See infra note 45.
13 See Finley, 795 F. Supp 1457; see also Finley, 100 F.3d at 684.
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supports a full-spectrum of artistic excellence within an economic
structure designed to support free expression.
I. PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES IN SUPPORT OF ARTISTIC FREEDOM
"As a result, we now can enjoy a rich gumbo of cultural andersonal
artistic expressions that did not exist before 1960."l
A. Founding Premise
The NEA was founded upon the premise that it is important to
fund all kinds of art on an ongoing basis utilizing federal funds to
support the arts for the benefit of the general public. 15  Since the
money is generated by the taxpayers, the public has a right to expect
that a diversity of interests be represented. 16 Since artistic expression
is at the very heart of American culture, money was made available to
help ensure the viability of the arts as well as the economic survival of
the artists. 17 To attain this goal, in 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson
signed legislation authorizing the National Endowment for the Arts
and Humanities. 1
B. Purity of Process
When the NEA was first chartered, the intent was to prevent
legislators and bureaucrats from making aesthetic judgements that
14 See David C. Mendoza, Foreword to UNDERSTANDING, PREPARING FOR,
AND RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES TO YOUR FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION viii
(National Campaign for Freedom of Expression 1998). Some examples of the vast
diversity of organizations that have received funding from the NEA and local arts
agencies include: Ballet Hispanico (New York City), Northwest Asian American Theatre
(Seattle), San Francisco Gay and Lesbian Film Festival, National Black Arts Festival
(Atlanta), California Indian Basketweavers Association, and Women Make Art (Austin).
Id.
15See GAIL B. RILEY, CENSORSHIP 17 (1998).
16 See Mendoza, supra note 14, at viii.
17 See Stuart Culver, Whistler v. Ruskin: The Courts, the Public, and Modern
Art, in THE ADMINISTRATION OF AESTHETICS 149 (Richard Burt ed., 1994).
18 National Foundation of the Arts and the Humanities Act, § 4.
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would place limits on artistic freedom and lead to arbitrary decisions
regarding which artists would receive funding. 19 This legislation
created procedures that removed legislators from the process and
implemented a democratic system of peer review panels. 20  These
panels consisted of recognized experts from the art community and
changed with each round of funding requests. 21 These experts were
instructed to grant funds based solely on artistic merit.22 The hope
was that this process would be insulated from "the pressures of the
marketplace, popular taste, and political constituencies." 23 The result,
therefore, would be that the agency would use an objective procedure
in determining which artists and projects deserved funding.
C. Promoting Freedom of Expression
One of the implied mandates of the NEA was to promote
exploratory artistry and experimentation. 24 As expressed in its report
on Public Law 89-209,25 the Senate required that the NEA place an
emphasis on nurturing the freedom of artistic expression.
26
As a result, public funding of the arts and humanities has been
a driving force behind the ever-increasing diversification in the
American cultural landscape. 27  The emphasis on exploration and
expansion mandated that public servants embrace artistic expression
in realms beyond those previously accepted. The initiative of public
funding for the arts corresponded with a period in national history
when a variety of people were attempting to break free of long-
19See Philip Brookman, Preface to CULTURE WARS, DOCUMENTS FROM THE
RECENT CONTROVERSIES IN THE ARTS xvi (Richard Bolton ed., 1992).
20 See id.
21 See Id.
22 See Id.
23 See Culver, supra note 17.
24 See Brookman, supra note 19, at xvi.
25 See National Foundation of the Arts and the Humanities Act, § 4.
26 See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE
ARTS, A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS (Sept.
1990).
27 See Mendoza, supra note 14, at viii.
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standing societal norms that had suppressed acceptance of minority
expression.28 Over the course of time, the combination of public
funding and cross-cultural influences fostered works of art
representing people across all walks of life. 29  "The culture of
America has finally begun to 'look like America'.
Multiculturalism is not a rhetorical phrase, nor a political slogan; it is
becoming our way of life.3 '
D. Culture Wars Leading to the Helms Amendment
The growing diversity and newly found freedom of expression
of those groups in America whose voices had not previously been
heard met with active resistance from the entrenched conservative
political infrastructure. 32 A solitary "letter to the editor" in the spring
of 1989 criticizing "Piss Christ" by Andres Serrano33 unleashed a
hotbed of grassroots opposition to the federal funding of art.
Criticism of Robert Mapplethorpe 34 followed closely and led to the
full-fledged ignition of the "culture war."37  These artists were
condemned for their "blasphemous" and objectionable images.36 The
28 See generally THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW
THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997); see also LONG ROAD TO
FREEDOM: THE ADVOCATE HISTORY OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (Mark
Thompson ed., 1994).
29 See Mendoza, supra note 14, at viii.
30 See id. at viii-ix.
31 See id. at ix.
32 See id.
33 See id Serrano's photographic work "Piss Christ" is a collage depiction of
a plastic crucifix submerged in a jar of urine. Id. Mr. Serrano, a well known
photographer of Afro-Caribbean descent, received the coveted Award in the Visual Arts,
and participated in the Bicentennial Exhibition at the Whitney Museum of Art. See id.
See also Nicholas Fox, NEA Under Siege: Artwork Sparks Congressional Challenge to
Agency's Reauthorization, NEW ART EXAMINER 18 (Summer 1989).
34 See Mendoza, supra note 14, at ix. Mapplethorpe was a homosexual
photographer whose work included images of sadomasochism. Id.
35See id.; see also Brookman, supra note 19 (detailing the political debates
regarding the federal funding of the arts during 1989 and 1990).36 See, e.g., Joseph Wesley Zeigler, ARTS IN CRISIS 69 (1994).
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NEA's funding of these artists left them open to attack by the media
and fueled the controversy. 37 High-profile lawmakers, Senators Jesse
Helms (R-NC) and Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY), jumped on the
opportunity to politicize the issue by complaining that these artists
were using public tax dollars to display materials which they thought
were objectionable. 38
As a direct result of the growing controversy, the Corcoran
Gallery in Washington, D.C. canceled a Mapplethorpe exhibit fearing
loss of funding in the next round of congressional grants.39 Instead of
distancing the Gallery from controversy, as intended, the cancellation
resulted in both loss of endowment funds and protests from the artistic
40
community.
In late 1989, Senator Jesse Helms' campaign against the NEA
led to the creation of a rider to the NEA appropriation bill. 4' This
rider, referred to as the Helms Amendment, was intended to prevent
the NEA from funding art that Senator Jesse Helms and his
constituents thought did not deserve funding.42  The Helms
Amendment and the restrictions it placed upon the NEA caused an
upheaval in the art world.43 This amendment signified the first time
Congress required content restrictions on NEA grant recipients.
These restrictions marked the beginning of a continuing erosion in an
37 See generally Brookman, supra note 19.
38 See Zeigler, supra note 36, at 69.
39 See Mendoza, supra note 14, at ix.
40 See id. at 73.
41 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 954 (1999)). The statute states, in pertinent part, that the NEA grant recipient may not
promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of the NEA or the
NEH may be considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of
sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals
engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. Id.
42 OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 30 (1996).
43 See, e.g., Bella Lewitzsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774
(C.D. Cal. 1991). Specifically, objections were made to the particular way the law was
administered: the agency's requirement that grant applicants sign a pledge to comply with
law. Id.
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artist's ability to be funded for all forms of artistic expression.44
E. Adoption of the Decency Clause
When the Helms Amendment expired, Congress enacted a
new statute referred to as the Decency Clause.45  This statute is the
statute that is in effect today. The Clause introduced two major
changes in the selection process followed by the NEA.46
Procedurally, the 1990 statute places more responsibility on
the NEA's chairperson with regard to selecting recipients.47 The new
statute still recognizes the continued use of peer review panels in
awarding grants.48  However, due to the structural nature of the
review process, the panels recommend more applicants than can be
funded because the criteria is less restrictive49 and the chairperson of
the NEA then decides who will receive funding.50 This places more
power in the hands of the chairperson than the original charter
See Mendoza, supra note 14, at ix.
45 Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-512, § 318, 104 Stat. 1960, 1963 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)
(1999). The Decency Clause reads as follows:
(d) No payment shall be made under this section except upon
application therefor which is submitted to the National
Endowment for the Arts in accordance with regulations issued
and procedures established by the Chairperson. In establishing
such regulations and procedures, the Chairperson shall ensure
that -
(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the
criteria by which applications are judged, taking
into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the American public...
Id.
46 See Fiss, supra note 43, at 32-33.
47See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments Act, § 318.
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Of more significance is the second change brought about by
the Decency Clause, that is, the introduction of the subjective terms
"decency and respect" as statutory requirements to the funding
criteria.52  These terms, along with "artistic merit or excellence,"
became factors for separating and choosing among eligible
applicants. 53 Thus, in practical application, when judging two works
that are equal in terms of artistic merit, if one is considered indecent
or disrespectful, then this subjective evaluation will count against the
artist's proposal and therefore, her funding.
54
In a sense, the Decency Clause allows the NEA to circumvent
the Constitution.55 Specifically, despite the fact that the NEA must
adhere to First Amendment standards in determining the eligibility of
arts applications, it is given wider latitude when determining which
projects to fund.56 The statute now requires more than just artistic
merit, instead the chairperson must consider "general standards of
decency and respect" and can deny grants based on these new
considerations. 5
7
In light of the Mapplethorpe fiasco, it is reasonable to
conclude that this basis could be used to deny funding to projects like
those of Mapplethorpe's. Given the fact that the Decency Clause
condones viewpoint discrimination, it is inevitable that funding will
be denied based on content as well as artistic considerations. Thus, a
governmental agency becomes party to potential First Amendment
violations and charges of censorship. "The particular issue is whether
the NEA should be allowed powers of censorship, or whether the state
as patron should be held to the same First Amendment standards as
51 See Fiss, supra note 43, at 32-33; see also National Foundation of the Arts
and the Humanities, § 4.
52 See Fiss, supra note 43, at 33.
53See id.
See id.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57See Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments Act, § 318.
446 [Vol. XVI
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the state as regulator."
58
The problem with the Decency Clause is that the term
"decency" has no precise legal definition. Even "obscenity," which is
illegal in the United States,59 has a precise legal definition. In the
absence of any legal definition, the interpretation of the Decency
Clause is a purely subjective judgment. This invites confusion for the
artist as well as the NEA and introduces the probability of
manipulation by the NEA as it attempts to administer these
standards.6 ° Particularly, "what is the line between disagreement and
'disrespect'? Whose 'standards,' 'beliefs,' and 'values' should artists
respect?"61
II. NEA v. FINLEY: THE TEST CASE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
DECENCY CLAUSE
A. Background
On June 29, 1990, NEA chairperson John Frohnmayer vetoed
NEA Theater Program grants to performance artists Karen Finley,
John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller.62 These grants had been
approved by peer panel review, but the panel's recommendations were
rejected by the National Council on the Arts.63 Each performer's
work dealt with the issue of sexuality. On September 27, 1990, these
artists filed suit in Los Angeles Federal District Court against the
NEA and its chairperson.64 The suit, filed through the National
58 See FISS, supra note 42, at 33.
59See Marcia Pally, "Decency" In The Arts, TIKKuN, Nov. 1, 1998, at 58.
60See Lee Lawrence, Arts Community Responds To Decision on "Decency, "
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 2, 1998.
61 See Pally, supra note 59.
62 See Brookman, supra note 19, at 357; see also Finley, 524 U.S. 569
(quoting Julie Ann Alagna, Note, Legislation, Reports and Debates Over Federally
Funded Art: Arts Community Left With an "Indecent" Compromise, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1545, 1546 n.2 (1991)).
63 See Brookman, supra note 19, at 357.
64 See id. at 360.
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Campaign for Freedom of Expression (NCFE) legal defense team,
charged that the NEA violated the artists' constitutional rights by
denying them panel-approved grants for political reasons. 65 Several
months later, the suit was amended to include a constitutional
challenge to the Decency Clause.66  Specifically, the amended
complaint challenged the provision on due process and First
Amendment grounds. 67 An artists' group, the National Association of
Artists' Organizations (NAAO), 68 joined the litigation on the side of
the grant applicants.69
B. District Court
In 1992, District Judge A. Wallace Tashima,7 ° in Finley v.
National Endowment for the Arts,7 1 agreed with the artists and held
that the Decency Clause was both unconstitutionally vague under the
Fifth Amendment's due process clause 72 and overbroad under the First
Amendment." Then, on June 9, 1993, following the court's ruling
rejecting the government's contention that it can deny grants for
political reasons, the NEA settled the claims by the individual
performance artists, who, as a result, received the amounts of their
vetoed grants, damages, and attorneys' fees.74
65 See id.
66 See Mendoza, supra note 14, at ix.
67 See Finley, 795 F. Supp. 1457.
68 See Mendoza, supra note 14, at 60. The NAAO is a nonprofit membership
organization dedicated to serving and promoting artist-run organizations: the primary
supporters, presenters, and makers of new and emerging work in the visual, performing,
media, literary, and interdisciplinary arts, providing a national voice advocating cultural
equity, freedom of expression, individual artists, and the organizations that serve them.
Id.
69 See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1463.
70 Judge Tashima has since been elevated to the Ninth Circuit.
71 See Finley, 795 F. Supp. 1457.
72 See id. at 1471-72 (discussing the Decency Clause in relation to the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
73 See id. at 1475-76 (holding that public funding gives rise to First
Amendment protection).
74See Finley v. NEA: The Supreme Court Decides, NCFE Q. (Supp.), July
448 [Vol. XVI
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C. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
On November 5, 1996, the Ninth Circuit United States Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court' ruling, finding that a provision
of the NEA's governing statute identifying the standard for approval
of funding applications violated the First and Fifth Amendments.75
Although the Ninth Circuit had already found the Decency Clause
unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause,7 6 it went on to
analyze the statute under the First Amendment as well.
7 7
The court found that the clause impermissibly restricted
artistic content and viewpoint. 78  Based largely on the Supreme
Court's 1995 decision in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,79 the
court stated that "[lit is axiomatic . . . that the government may not
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it
conveys. 80  The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[e]ven when the
government is funding speech, it may not distinguish between
speakers on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint or otherwise aim at
the suppression of dangerous ideas. 81
1998, at S3; see also National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 577.
75See Finley, 100 F.3d at 680 (holding that the Decency Clause "violates due
process because no standard of conduct is specified at all, and the statute thus provides no
ascertainable standard for inclusion and exclusion").
76 See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471-72.
77See Finley, 100 F.3d at 681.
78 See id. at 680-81 (reasoning that attempting to ascertain the public's
aesthetic values "gives rise to the [classic] danger of [vague laws], arbitrary and
discriminatory application . . . [tihe twin dangers of vague law - lack of notice and
arbitrary or discriminatory application - may chill the exercise of important
constitutional rights").
79See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (holding that the University of Virginia could not provide money for student
organizations generally while refusing to fund religious student associations).
80See Finley, 100 F.3d at 681(citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828).
81 See id. at 682 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 548 (1983) (quoting, in turn, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513
(1959))).
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D. The Supreme Court
Almost a decade after the lawsuit was initiated, the United
States Supreme Court, on June 25, 1998, in an 8-to-1 decision, 82
reversed the lower courts' decision and declared the Decency Clause
of Title 20, section 954(d)(1) of the United States Code
constitutional.8 3  The Court noted that "[a]ny content based
considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making
process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding .. "84 In
upholding the law, the Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Federal District Court in Los
Angeles, each of which declared the Decency Clause
unconstitutionally vague and necessarily viewpoint-discriminatory in
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.85
III. KEY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN NEA v. FINLEY
A remarkable amount of speculation and anticipation preceded
the Court's announcement of its decision regarding the First
Amendment. In general, the majority opinion was incoherent and
disjointed. The concurring opinion was as far removed as possible
from the majority ideology while still maintaining the same judgment.
The dissent counter-argued the points of the majority's opinion and
concluded that the Decency Clause is unconstitutional. Taken as a
whole, the disparity of beliefs expressed in these three opinions
exacerbated the complexity of the decision. The end result is that
although the majority upheld the First Amendment's guarantee of the
artists' freedom of speech, in the same breath, it told the artists to take
into account "decency" and "respect" but without defining the
meaning of these terms. Artists and funding organizations have been
82 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 571. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and Kennedy joined in the opinion. Justice Ginsberg joined in part. Justices
Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment only and Justice Souter dissented. Id.
83 See id. at 572-3.
84 See id. at 572 (syllabus).
85 See Finley, 100 F.3d 671; see also Finley, 795 F.Supp. 1457.
450 [Vol. XVI
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left with no clear guidelines to follow.
A. Burden of Proof Standard
The timing of a lawsuit is of primary importance in
determining the statute's constitutionality since the type of
constitutional challenge brought will determine the burden of proof
standard.86 If, for example, one files a lawsuit in response to a grant
denial this is referred to as an "as applied" challenge. 7 A lawsuit not
timed to coincide with a specific instance of grant denial, but based on
88a general principle, is an "on its face" or a "facial" challenge. Here,
the Court considered this claim as a "facial" challenge because the
NEA had already paid the grant money originally denied prior to the
appeal.89 Since no specific grant was at issue, the "as applied" claim
was not applicable. 9
0
In this case, if the statute were to be considered
unconstitutional, the complainant had to prove that a particular
viewpoint would be suppressed, establishing a heavier burden of proof
standard than that of an "as applied" challenge. 91 Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, writing for the majority, upheld the "facial"
constitutionality of the statute stating that the litigants did not meet
that burden.9 2 In Justice David Souter's dissent, he expressed that
because the statute was overbroad, a "facial" challenge in this case
86 See, e.g., FW/WPBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (noting that
"facial challenges to legislation are generally disfavored").
87See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 796 (describing the uses of facially unconstitutional challenges and "as applied"
challenges in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)).
88 See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796.
89 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 580.
90 See id. at 578.
91 See id. at 580 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 at 183 (1993))
(reasoning that facial invalidations should be rare); see also United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (reasoning that "[a] facial challenge is ... the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully").
92 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (holding that
20 U.S.C. §, 954(d)(1) is facially valid, as it neither inherently interferes with First
Amendment rights nor violates constitutional principles).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
was appropriate.93
Once the burden of proof standard was established, the next
step was to decide the constitutional issues. Three constitutional
issues were addressed: viewpoint discrimination; 94 impermissible
vagueness;95 and substantial overbreadth.96
B. Viewpoint Discrimination in the Context of Government Funding
The issue of viewpoint discrimination - when one viewpoint
is favored over another, and therefore the disfavored one is suppressed
-- comes to the fore when the government subsidizes speech.97
Viewpoint discrimination is permissible in some circumstances and
not in others. For example, viewpoint discrimination is inherent when
the government, as speaker, undertakes a campaign to promote public
policy on a particular issue.98 In such a case, an obvious consequence
is that the opposing viewpoint is not promoted, resulting in viewpoint
discrimination. This is a function of the government's role as speaker
and in this case, viewpoint discrimination is constitutional.99 When
the government chooses. instead to subsidize other speakers or forms
of expression, the government is, in essence, acting as a patron of
private speech rather than directly funding a particular viewpoint. In
this case, the goal is to encourage a variety of expressions or speakers
and therefore, viewpoint discrimination is not permitted - due to
freedom of speech guarantees - and is unconstitutional.100
Two primary cases the. Supreme Court in Finley cited were
93 See id. at 600-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
94 See discussion infra Part III.B.
95 See discussion infra Part IIC.
96 See discussion infra Part II1.D.
97 See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 192.
98 See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
99 See id.
100 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at.834 (explaining that the university or
the government may not act on viewpoint when it "does not itself speak or subsidize
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers").
452 [Vol. XVI
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Rust v. Sullivani°0 and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia.10 2  Rust was an example of government as
speaker and Rosenberger of government as patron. In Rust, the Court
upheld a government-sponsored family planning clinic's regulation
stating that it was "speaking" for the government, and held that the
government has the right to control the message it conveys.'0 3 The
government "has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion
of the other."' 0 4  Rust established the principle that the selective
funding of one program while denying funding to an alternative
program constitutes permissible viewpoint discrimination.
0 5
In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court decided whether a public
university's refusal to pay the printing costs for all qualifying student
publications was constitutional. The Court decided that the
university's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that
violated the First Amendment freedom of speech.' 0 6  Viewpoint
constraints applied since the government was acting as a patron "to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."'
0 7
In Finley, because viewpoint discrimination was an issue, the
Supreme Court first had to decide whether viewpoint discrimination
occurred. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the NEA's
favoring "decent" applications over "indecent" applications
constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 0 8 If viewpoint
101 See Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (holding that an agency regulation denying
grantee use of federal funds for abortion counseling does not violate the First
Amendment).
102 See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that when the
government is not speaking, but is encouraging other speakers through university funded
student newspapers, viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional).
103 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198-200. The Court explained that when the
government is "speaking" through its projects, the government may control the message it
conveys. See id.
104 See id. at 193 (explaining that there is a difference between state-
sanctioned viewpoints discriminations and state encouragement of an alternative activity
more in keeping with legislative policy).
105 See id. at 198-200.
106 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837, 845-46.
107 See id. at 834.
18 See Finley, 524 U.S. 569.
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discrimination had occurred, they had to rule on whether it was
permissible based on the doctrines in the cases cited above. The
following chart illustrates the varying Supreme Court opinions based
on these issues.
Issue Mjority Concurrence. Dissent
Is the Decency Clause facially No Yes Yes.
viewpoint discriminatory?
If so, is it permissible? No Yes No
The first problem with the Supreme Court's Finley decision is
that the Court is split on whether applying the Decency Clause in arts
funding is or is not practicing viewpoint discrimination. The second
problem is that the Court is split on whether practicing viewpoint
discrimination in this context is or is not permissible. The disparity of
interpretation among the Justices of the Constitution's First
Amendment, specifically regarding the viewpoint discrimination
issue, highlights the ideological split among these individuals.
It is interesting to note the disparate opinions in the case. On
the first question, as to whether the Decency Clause is constitutional,
the majority believed that it was constitutional because it was not
viewpoint discrimination.' 0 9  However, the concurrence and the
dissent strongly disagreed and stated that the Decency Clause was
absolutely viewpoint discrimination. 1  On the second question, the
majority and the dissent agreed that if the NEA withheld funding
based primarily on a particular disfavored viewpoint that this would
be unconstitutional.' In contrast, the concurrence stated that
viewpoint discrimination was perfectly legitimate in this context and
was therefore constitutional."
12
1. Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion
The majority's estimation that the Decency Clause is not
109 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
110 See discussion infra Part III.B.2,3.
III See discussion infra note 121.
112 See discussion infra note 130.
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viewpoint discriminatory is based on an interpretation that has several
components. The first is that the majority noted that there are no
categorical prohibitions regarding funding "indecent" or
"disrespectful" artwork.' 13 Second, the majority suggested that the
phrase "take into consideration" is not given any particular emphasis
or weight. 14 According to the majority, elements of "decency" and
"respect" are one of many factors to be considered.1 5 Thus, when
taken as a whole in determining an artwork's eligibility for funding,
the end result will not lead to one particular viewpoint being
suppressed. 16 Distinguishing Rosenberger, Justice O'Connor argued
that arts funding involves the necessity of content-based aesthetic
judgements among numerous applicants for limited funds.' 17 Unlike
the University of Virginia, the NEA does not indiscriminately
"encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."' 18 According
to the majority, the primary goal of the NEA is awarding grants based
on the achievement of excellence."' Encouraging a diversity of
viewpoints is a by-product.
Justice O'Connor did not find a legitimate danger that the
statute would be utilized to preclude or punish the expression of
particular views, and therefore would not significantly compromise
First Amendment values. 12 0  Significantly, Justice O'Connor stated
that in an "as applied" challenge, if the government targeted the
suppression of dangerous ideas and if a subsidy were manipulated to
have a coercive effect, then relief could be appropriate.' 21  The
113 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 581 (stating that the Decency Clause does not
impose a categorical requirement).
1 14 See id. at 580-81.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 580 (stating that the NEA read the Decency Clause as merely
hortatory).
117 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 585.
118 See id. at 586.
119 See id
120 See id. at 582.
121 See id. at 587 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) and Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
237 (1987) in which it was stated that "if the NEA were to leverage its power to award
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majority, however, concluded that the provision was impotent and
would in fact not lead inexorably to viewpoint discrimination. 2
2
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed with Justice Souter's
dissent that the Decency Clause is viewpoint discrimination and stated
that the statute "means what it says."' 123 Justice Scalia ridiculed the
Court's interpretation of the Decency Clause, stating that it renders it
meaningless. 124  He wrote that the majority opinion upheld the
constitutionality of the provision "by gutting it."' 25  Justices Scalia
and Thomas concurred in the judgment with the majority but not in
the underlying theory.'2 6 Both Justices rejected the idea of funding
limits based on the First Amendment's freedom of speech
provisions.127
Justice Scalia distinguished Finley from the Rosenberger
case. 128 He differentiated Rosenberger as a limited-forum case totally
different from the NEA context where it is the business of government
to favor and disfavor points of view on various subjects.129 However,
he did not explain why the subsidization program in Rosenberger was
a public forum and the NEA program was not.
According to Justice Scalia, viewpoint and content
discrimination in government funding is constitutional;' 30 it is not an
subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria inot a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then
we would confront a different issue").
122 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 583-84.
123 See id. at 591(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that it is absolutely clear that
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public are now
criteria for awarding NEA grants).
124 See id. at 591.
125 See id. at 590.
126 See id. at 600.
127 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
"[t]hose who wish to create indecent and disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as
they were before the enactment of this statute").
128See id. at 598.
129 See id.
130See id. at 590.
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"abridgement" of the freedom of speech. 131 He pointed out that artists
retain full freedom of speech in that they can produce art, including
"indecent" and "disrespectful" art, independent of government
funding. 132  He reasoned that the government could have banned
funding of "indecent" and "disrespectful" speech altogether; however,
the government took the lesser step of disfavoring such speech., 33 In
his opinion, government policy is implemented in the political arena
and therefore protection of freedom of speech lies within the realm of
the political process.'
34
3. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter, the sole dissenter in this case, counter-argued
much of the majority opinion and concluded that the Decency Clause,
on its face, does impermissibly discriminate based on viewpoint.
35
He contended that the government failed to explain why the Decency
Clause should be exempted from the fundamental rule of the First
Amendment that viewpoint discrimination, in the exercise of public
authority over expressive activity, is unconstitutional. 36 He pointed
to the congressional debate that lead to the adoption of the Decency
Clause, 137 and said that the Decency Clause's origin - the
Mapplethorpe-Serrano controversy - confirmed that the statute was
131 See id. at 595 (suggesting that content- and viewpoint-based criteria upon
which grant applications are to be evaluated are perfectly constitutional).
132 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
"[tihose who wish to create indecent and disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as
they were before the enactment of this statute... [a]rtists remain free to speak indecently or
disrespectfully, but without government funding").
133 See id. at 600.
134 See id. at 598.
135 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 601 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court's conclusion that the proviso is not viewpoint based, and that the NEA may
permissibly engage in viewpoint-based discrimination, are mistaken).
136 See id. at 601 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)) ("If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.").
137 See id. at 603.
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aimed at offensive speech.'38
Also, Justice Souter examined the textual language of the
statute. He stated that the terms "decency and respect," are
"quintessentially viewpoint based."'139  He argued that reducing the
Decency Clause to "considerations" that can be ignored, as the
majority suggested, undermined Congress' initial intent when
implementing the statute.'40  Nonetheless, even as mere
"considerations,' ''decency" and "respect" are viewpoint-based
criteria.' 41 In support of this argument, he said that based on First
Amendment principles, it is irrelevant whether the forbidden criteria
are total prohibitions or merely factors in the decision-making
process.
42
Secondly, Justice Souter argued that viewpoint-based
decisions in the disbursement of government subsidies (as in this
context) are unconstitutional. 43 Justice Souter developed a viewpoint
discrimination distinction between the government as speaker on the
one hand, and government as patron on the other. 144  Accordingly,
when the government itself speaks or funds private parties to
disseminate its message, viewpoint discrimination is allowed. 45 He
explained that this was the basis for Rust, where the government
expressed its pronatalist, anti-abortion message through private
grantees.' 
46
138
See id. at 603-04 (concluding that Congress clearly intended the Decency
Clause to be applied in a discriminatory manner against certain viewpoints, especially
offensive art).
139 See id. at 605 (stating that the evidence of viewpoint discrimination was
patently obvious).
140 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 604-05 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141 See id. at 608 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. 28672 (1990) (stating that "[t]he
decency and respect proviso 'mandates that in the awarding of funds, in the award process
itself, general standards of decency must be accorded').
142 See id. at 609-10.
143See id. at 61i-12.
See id.
145 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 610-11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[g]ovemment is of course entitled to engage in viewpoint discrimination...").
146 See id. at 612 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196) (explaining that the
government, when funding a public clinic, may limit health care workers' speech
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There are, however, limits on permissible viewpoint
discrimination. For example, if the government seeks to use its
funding of programs to regulate the speakers who participate, it may
not discriminate based on viewpoint. 47 In analogizing Rosenberger
with Finley, Justice Souter said that these two cases are not in the
government as speaker category. 48  He said that the government
disbursed funds to encourage a diversity of viewpoints, acting more as
a patron than as a speaker.' 49 Expounding on this conclusion, he said
that the Court in Rosenberger indicated that discrimination against a
class of speech including multiple viewpoints is viewpoint
discrimination.' 50 Justice Souter rejected the majority's attempt to
distinguish NEA funding from Rosenberger on the basis that in this
case numerous art applicants apply for limited grant funds.' 51 He
opined that scarcity of resources does not justify viewpoint
discrimination.' 52
C. Vagueness Doctrine
Another important constitutional issue to be decided in the
Finley case is whether the Decency Clause was "void for vagueness"
under the First and Fifth Amendments. A vague statute regulating the
freedom of speech activity is fundamentally unfair, violating both due
regarding abortion and that when it does, it is not engaging in viewpoint discrimination,
but is merely choosing to fund one activity over another, which is constitutional).
147See id. at 612-14 (citing Rosenberger as precedent for not discriminating
when funding private speakers).
148 See id. at 612-13.
149 See id. at 613.
150 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("When the
government acts as patron, subsidizing the expression of others, it may not prefer one
lawfully stated view over another."); see also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804
(1984) (prohibiting the government from regulating speech based on viewpoint) "[wlhen
the government acts as patron ... it may not prefer one lawfully stated view over
another.")
151 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 835) ("The government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among
private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity.").
152 See id. at 614-15.
4591999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
process challenges under the Fifth Amendment and freedom of
expression under the First Amendment.1 53 A statute is facially invalid
if it is not written with sufficient clarity and definiteness 'to inform
persons of ordinary intelligence what actions are proscribed.'5 4  If
people have to guess at the meaning of an unclear statute, the statute is
unconstitutionally vague because it may punish innocent people
without giving them adequate warning that their behavior violated the
law. 155 By the same token, fear of violating a vague statute may cause
people to avoid constitutionally protected conduct.'
56
Although both the district court and the court of appeals found
the Decency Clause unconstitutionally vague, Judge Kleinfeld of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in his.dissent, argued that if the terms
"decency and respect" are vague, then the same concern is raised
regarding the meaning of "artistic excellence.', 157  Judge Kleinfeld
posited that if the "void for vagueness" doctrine is applicable to the
terms "decency and respect," it follows that the government cannot
disperse funds based on the criteria of "excellence."' 158 The Supreme
Court addressed this constitutional issue as well. Although the
majority acknowledged that the terms in question were undeniably
opaque,159 the majority incorporated Judge Kleinfeld's opinion and
concluded that in the competitive grant context a degree of
imprecision is unavoidable.'
60
Actually, the Supreme Court majority seized on the vagueness
of the terms "decency and respect" as a saving grace.' 6' Justice
153 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating in pertinent part that "[n]o person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech"); see also Finley, 100 F. 3d 671.
154See Grayned v. U.S. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
155See id. at 108-09.
See id.
157 See Finley, 100 F.3d at 688 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
158 See id. at 688-89 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
159 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 588.
160 See id. at 589 ("In the context of selective subsidies, it is not always
feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity.").
161 See id.
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O'Connor reasoned that because the language was imprecise and
subjective, it was unlikely to lead to the categorical exclusion of
"indecent" or "disrespectful" art.16 2 The concurrence concluded that
the vagueness doctrine had no application in the subsidy context as
opposed to in a regulatory or government as speaker context.
1 63
Justice Souter agreed with the majority that a degree of imprecision is
unavoidable in the competitive grant context such as art funding.
164
D. Substantial Overbreadth
A final constitutional consideration pertinent to -the Finley
case is the "substantial overbreadth doctrine" under the First
Amendment. A substantially overbroad statute that indiscriminately
reaches both constitutionally protected and unprotected activity may
be considered facially void.' 65 An overbroad statute has the effect of
deterring privileged activity, such as free speech.166 A vague statute
may also be declared overbroad because people may unnecessarily
refrain from protected expressive activities as they attempt to comply
with the statute.' 67  Thus, this doctrine seeks to avoid both
substantially overbroad statutes and the self-censorship that inevitably
surrounds vague statutes. 16 8  A challenge to a "substantially
overbroad" statute may not only violate the litigant's right of free
expression, but also may cause other people not involved in the case
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
69
Therefore, those not currently affected can bring a First Amendment
claim.'
70
162 See id. at 580.
163 See id. at 599. (Scalia, J., concurring).
164 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 622 n. 17 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
prohibited chilling effect was a consequence of viewpoint discrimination and
overbreadth).
165 See, e.g., Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1963).
See id. at 612.
167 See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnitati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971).
168 See Broaderick, 413 U.S. at 612.
169 See id.
170 See id.; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431-32 (1963)
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The Court's application of the overbreadth doctrine is
considered "strong medicine" and should be employed only as a "last
resort."'' Therefore, only a "substantially" overbroad statute that will
lead to the suppression of free speech may be considered
unconstitutional.172  For instance, in the First Amendment context,
laws that suffer from "substantial overbreadth," that have relatively
few constitutional applications, and that threaten oppression of a
significant amount of speech, may be held facially unconstitutional.
73
Justices Souter and O'Connor took diametrically opposed
positions on the issue of overbreadth. In her majority opinion, Justice
O'Connor rejected the claim that the Decency Clause was
substantially overbroad leading to viewpoint discrimination.
74
Although the appellants challenged the statute based on a First
Amendment claim, the majority did not conduct an overbreadth
analysis. The majority simply concluded that the Decency Clause
would not cause artists to refrain from constitutionally protected
artistic expression because the threat is too indirect or diffuse . 7
5
In contrast, in his dissent, Justice Souter argued that the Court
was required to conduct an overbreadth analysis based on the fact that
the appellants' claim was based on the First Amendment and are
therefore entitled to an overbreadth analysis. 76 He suggested that this
analysis would have revealed that the utilization of the Decency
Clause substantially overreaches protected artistic expression and that
people will abstain from anything likely to offend an NEA panel
member in an attempt to secure an NEA grant.'
77
,
(explaining that under the "overbreadth doctrine," First Amendment challenges are
allowed by those currently unaffected by the offending statute).
See id. at 613.
172 See id. at 613; see also Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1476.
173See Thomas Dienes, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, LEGAL
TIMES, July 13, 1998, at S33; see also Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989)
(stating that the application of the overbreadth doctrine seeks to prevent the "chilling" of
constitutionally protected expression).
174 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 571.
175 See id. at 587.
176 See id. at 618-620 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177 See id. (indicating that the Decency Clause has the "significant power to
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IV. CRITICAL RESPONSE
The Supreme Court's upholding of the Decency Clause is
unfair to the NEA review panels and to the artists who have to abide
by these obscure guidelines. Specifically, the Supreme Court's
varying opinions as to the meaning and application of the Decency
Clause indicates what the NEA panels are faced with in terms of
properly carrying out their duties. The artists will be equally as hard-
pressed to know to what degree they must consider the Decency
Clause in order to help ensure funding.
Although NEA funding is based on an inevitably vague term
such as "excellence," in the art context, the use of such a vague term
does not in and of itself justify implementing the additional terms
"decency and respect." The NEA panels are already charged with the
daunting task of judging and evaluating the intangible qualities of an
artist's submission. Despite the inherent vagueness of criteria such as
"excellence" and "merit," it is less troubling to reward an artist for
"excellence" than to penalize her for violations of "decency and
respect."' 178  The practice of rewarding "excellence" as a form of
positive reinforcement is a universally accepted principle. 79 Given
this practice, if the art submitted for NEA funding is "excellent," but
according to some crosses the line of "decency and respect," it seems
inevitable that at least some art that is worthy of funding - based on
its "excellence" - would not receive funding because it crosses the
subjective line of "decency and respect."
With regards to Justice Scalia's concurrence, the driving force
of his opinion is that Congress has the right to discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint in a subsidy program (where the government is
patron) because it is unlikely to have a coercive effect. 80 However, to
imply that viewpoint discrimination does not apply in the
subsidization context disregards several cases in which the Court
chill artistic production and display").
178 See Simon Frankel, Law For Art's Sake, RECORDER, Nov. 27, 1996, at 4.
179 See id As Boalt Hall School of Law Professor Post remarked, "[girants
to achieve artistic excellence are reasonable because as a culture we share commitments
to the worth of artistic merit." See id.
180 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 598.
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assumed that First Amendment principles do apply to government
subsidies. In addition, Justice Scalia's assumption that the political
process will protect the rights of the people, especially of dissenters
and minorities, is unacceptable.18' Given the importance of a public
subsidy to the arts in our society, the idea that the government would
now be able to buy up and control people's rights is frightening and
flies in the face of the First Amendment.
182
Another criticism of the decision is that the Court upheld the
Decency Clause in light of the fact that the NEA grant program was
established in order "to help create and sustain . . . a climate
encouraging freedom of thought, imagination and inquiry."' 183  It is
particularly ironic and disheartening that the NEA is now placed in
the awkward position of applying vague standards and potentially
suppressing freedom of speech. Based on its founding premise, the
NEA has sought to encourage and foster visual artists, composers,
poets, dancers, and other artists to express themselves artistically and
individually. 18
4
However, only Justice Souter seemed to support the NEA's
originally implied mandate. He properly viewed the NEA grants as a
prime example of the government acting as patron to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers. Accordingly, of the three
181 See Dienes, supra note 176.
182 See id.
183 See National Foundation of the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-209, § 4, 79 Stat. 845, 846 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
184 See National Endowment for the Arts: 1999 Grant Awards (Apr. 10,
1999) (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http:://arts.endow.gov/leam.99Grants/C-P1.html>. A few
examples of recent grants awarded by the NEA include: Academy of Indian Performing
Arts, Inc. (supporting the national tour of Kanya, a multimedia work based on Indian
classical dance, music, and poetry), Americas Society, Inc. (supporting the touring
exhibition Delving Deeper: Latin American Art from the Guggenheim Museum, with
accompanying catalogue and education programs. The exhibition will present a selection
of one of the significant but virtually unknown collections of Latin American art from the
60's and 70's in the United States), Arab Community Center for Economic and Social
Services (supporting a five-city tour of three Arabic traditional music groups), Ballet
Theatre Foundation, Inc. (American Ballet Theatre) (supporting the planning, rehearsal,
and performance costs of American Ballet Theatre's Audience and Repertory
Enhancement Project in six cities. Id.
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opinions, Justice Souter's is the most honest and satisfying. Unlike
the majority, he confronted the issues directly. Unlike Justice Scalia,
he attempted to address and apply relevant precedent. Furthermore,
his analysis is largely consistent with established doctrine.
V. CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The fight against censorship is open and dangerous and thus heroic,
while the battle against self-censorship is anonymous, lonely, and
unwitnessed - a source of humiliation and shame for the
collaborator.... You become stricter and more suspicious than
anyone else could, because you know what no censor could ever
discover -your most secret, unspoken thoughts .... 85
A. Media Influence Perpetuates Ambiguity
Possibly the most unfortunate result of the Finley case has
been the media's superficial spin on the Supreme Court's decision.
8 6
Particularly, advocates of "decency" are citing the Finley decision as
the end of funding, for what they consider to be "family-unfriendly"
art.'8 7  "The Supreme Court validated the right of the American
people to not pay for art that offends their sensibilities," stated former
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich.188 Others praise the decision as
allowing the NEA to further regulate expression through
governmental subsidy programs. 8 9 For example, Marshall Whitman,
director of congressional relations for the Heritage Foundation, told
the Washington Post that validating the Decency Clause clearly shows
185 DANILO Kis, HoMoPOETICUS (1985).
186 Ellen Yaroshefsky, The Supreme Passes, NCFE Q. (special supp.), July
1998, at S2; see also Robert M. O'Neil, Artists, Grants and Rights: The NEA Controversy
Revisited, 9 N.YL. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 85, 105 (1991) (stating that "[m]useums and
galleries may be less venturesome in seeking bold and controversial works").
187 "Decency" Supporters Claim Victory, NCFE Q. (special supp.), July
1998, at S1.
188 See id.
189 See id. at S4.
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that Congress had the prerogative to add more restrictions.' 90
B. The General Public is Confused and Holds Misperceptions
Despite pockets of support, many people believe this decision
to be a serious setback for freedom of expression. The fact is that the
majority of people do not examine Supreme Court opinions; they just
look at the bottom line.' 91 As a result, these people will wrongly
believe that the decision stands for the proposition that it is acceptable
to deny funding to "indecent" or "controversial" artists. 192 Rather
than push the boundaries, people will comport with their perception of
the Supreme Court's opinion and will censor themselves.193
C. The Art Community's Response: Self-Censorship
The art community's reaction to the Court's decision focused
on and took issue with the finding that artists and art presenters would
probably not "be compelled to steer too far clear of any 'forbidden
area'.''1 4 Because the Court chose not to clarify the terms "decency"'
and "respect," the Decency Clause potentially can be used as a tool of
discrimination and censorship against artists and organizations that
present art. 195 Referring to the Decency Clause, Roberto Bedoya,
Executive Director of the NAAO said:
What is most disheartening is that the Justices did not
understand the chilling effect that this language has
had upon the arts community. Now we are
constrained by 'decency and respect,' but we don't
know what these words mean. Instead, we must
guess, behave with caution and make publicly
supported art subject to the whims of governmental
190 See id. at S i.
191See Yaroshefsky, supra note 186.
192 See id.
193 See supra note 187.
194 Roberto Bedoya, Supreme Court Upholds "Decency and Respect"
Requirement, (Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.naao.org/nea5.html>.
See id.
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powers. Members of the arts community which seek
support from the NEA will once again be forced to
self-censor.1 9
6
The decision provides troubling implications for all
government programs that involve funding of the arts, museums,
libraries and other institutions. 197 By suggesting that the government
may attach subjective conditions and apply vague criteria to its
funding of cultural and educational institutions, the decision has a
serious potential to violate freedom of speech rights. Individuals and
institutions may abstain from controversial topics or viewpoints in
order to receive needed funds.' 98
D. NEA is Unable to Implement Clear Decisions
Another problem is that the decision seems to contradict
precedents holding that "even in the provision of subsidies, the
government may not seek 'the suppression of dangerous ideas'."' 99
Justice O'Connor insinuated that the Court might find unconstitutional
any application of the Decency Clause that amounted to clear
viewpoint discrimination. 200  However, she also noted that the
government may allocate competitive funding through subsidies
according to criteria that would otherwise be impermissible if direct
regulation of speech were at stake.20  Thus, the question arises,
"[w]ill the Supreme Court ever find a situation where the decision-
making in government-subsidized arts constitutes a violation of the
First Amendment? ' 20 2
196 See Justices Cold to "Chilling Effect," NCFE Q. (special supp.), July
1998, at S I.
197 See People For the American Way Foundation, In The Courts, Finley v.
NEA, (Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.pfaw.org/corts/priorcases.shtml>.
198 See id.
199See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 587-88.
202 See Yaroshefsky, The Supreme Court Passes, NCFE Q. (special supp.),
July 1998, at S2.
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E. The Vicious Cycle. The Issue Goes Back to the Courts
1. The Esperanza Center
In September 1997, the San Antonio City Council voted to
eliminate all arts funding to the Esperanza Center, a national leader in
combining cultural arts programming with a broad range of social
justice issues.20 3  The City's Cultural Arts Board made this
recommendation despite the Center's number one ranking by
community peer panelists and its six-year funding history. 20 4  City
officials stated that Esperanza was targeted due to the "in your face"
social and cultural views displayed in its presentations.20 5 The City
has justified its action towards the Esperanza by suggesting that
publicly funded art is not subject to the mandates of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
20 6
On August 4, 1998, the Esperanza Center filed a lawsuit
against the City of San Antonio in Federal District Court.20 7 Two
other organizations for which the Esperanza acts as fiscal sponsor, the
San Antonio Lesbian and Gay Media Project and VAN (a San
Antonio-based arts advocacy organization),20 8 are also plaintiffs in the
litigation.209 This suit is the first arts funding litigation after Finley.21°
Esperanza claims that the City abridged their free speech rights on the
basis of viewpoint discrimination and violated the equal protection
203 Government May Not Suppress "Disfavored Viewpoints" In Making Arts
Funding Decisions, Esperanza Center, (June 25, 1998) (visited Oct. 25, 1999)
<http://www.esperanzacenter.org/fundingcut/finley I .htm>.
204 See d
205 See id.
206 See id.207
207 See NAAO, Cultural Advocacy, (Nov. 22, 1998) (visited Oct. 13,1999)
<http://www.naao.org/culadv.html>.
208 See Esperanza Sues to Regain Funding by San Antonio, NCFE Q.,
Autumn 1998, at 1. Esperanza serves as the fiscal sponsor for VAN and the Media
Project which were intended to receive funds from the City of San Antonio before their
1998 budgets were eliminated. Id.
209 See NAAO, supra note 207.
210 See id.
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provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Esperanza
asserts that the City discriminated against the organizations without a
rational basis; they claim the City acted solely to appease public
animus.2 11 The lead attorney for Esperanza said that the City violated
the Constitution by allowing prejudice and subjectivity to influence
their arts funding decision.212  Esperanza and its co-plaintiffs are
seeking a reversal of the City's decision and an order mandating the
City's adherence to its merit-based criteria.213
2. The Brooklyn Museum of Art
The latest arts funding controversy involves the Brooklyn
Museum of Art ("BMA") in its decision to challenge New York City
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's threat to withdraw City funding over a
controversial art exhibit. 2 14 The show "Sensation" features the work
of prominent young British artists.215 Most notably, Chris Ofili's
work, "The Holy Virgin Mary," incited the Mayor's criticism due to
the artist's use of elephant dung on the painting. 2 16 Mr. Ofili, a British
artist of Nigerian heritage, uses elephant dung in many of his works as
a reference to his African heritage.217 Mayor Giuliani, in attempting
to censor the art exhibit, is trying to place his ideas of what art is as
criterion for determining if particular art works should or should not
be funded.218 On September 22, 1999, the Mayor's office stated it
would terminate its approximately $500,000 a month funding to the
211 See Esperanza Sues to Regain Funding by San Antonio, NCFE Q.,
Autumn 1998, at 6.
212 See id
213 See id.
214 See Liz Willen, Giuliani: No Show BMA Told to Pull Exhibit, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 23, 1999, at A5.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 PFA WF to Major Giuliani: Hands off the First Amendment!, PEOPLE FOR
THE AMERICAN WAY, (Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.pfaw.org/news/press//show.cgi?
article=939249417>.
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BMA if the exhibit was not canceled.219 Based on this position, BMA
filed suit against the City on First Amendment grounds.220  On
October 2, 1999, the BMA's Board of Directors decided to open the
exhibit to the public in support of the artists.22
On November 1, 1999, Judge Nina Gershon of the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of New York declared that
Mayor Giuliani's decision to stop funding the BMA violated the
Constitution.222 Judge Gershon ordered the City to restore the BMA's
funding, which had been previously appropriated, and abstain from
delaying or refusing any future funding as a consequence of
"Sensation." 223 The City and the Mayor relied on Finley to support
their claim that viewpoint discrimination in arts funding is
permissible.224 However, Judge Gershon viewed this case as an "as
applied" challenge unlike the "facial" challenge in Finley and
therefore, the City and the Mayor's argument was misplaced.225 In
addition, this case was distinguishable from Finley because as Judge
Gershon stated, it was clear that the decision to withhold an already
appropriated general operating subsidy from the BMA was used to
"discriminate invidiously . . . in such a way as to 'aim at the
suppression of dangerous ideas'. 226 Thus, "[tihere can be no greater
showing of a First Amendment violation" than the City's decision to
withhold funding in an attempt to suppress the particular viewpoints
expressed in the exhibit.227
219 See Mark Hamblett, City, Museum Clash on Discovery, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5,
1999, at I.
220 See id.
221 Free Expression and Arts Groups Applaud Brooklyn Museum of Art,
NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.ncfe.net/
1999/September/brooklyn.html>.
222 See Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences v. New York City, No. 99-
CV6071, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16709, at *1, *46 (E.D. N.Y. Nov. 1, 1999).
223 See Id. at *64.
224 See Id. at *52-53.
225 See Id.
226 Id. at *45-46 (citing to Regan, 561 U.S. at 548).
227 Id. at *46.
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3. Analysis
The Esperanza and BMA challenges against their respective
cities are "as applied" challenges. Because of the timing of the cases,
the burden of proof is less than the "facial" challenge in Finley.
Hence, these political decisions to exclude public funding to these art
organizations present a stronger case for unconstitutionality than
Finley. As the Supreme Court noted in Finley, a "pressing
Constitutional question would arise if government funding resulted in
the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to 'drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace'." 228 This scenario
is precisely illustrated in the Esperanza and BMA cases. For example,
as Judge Gershon stated in the BMA case, the government acting as
patron withheld a subsidy in an attempt "to coerce the museum into
relinquishing its First Amendment rights." 229 Both cases exemplify
the kind of misuse by public'officials that Justice O'Connor likely was
mindful of when she warned against withholding a subsidy to impose
a "penalty on disfavored viewpoints.
230
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Vision For a Full-Spectrum of Cultural Excellence
The Supreme Court's upholding of the Decency Clause has
opened the door for the NEA's misuse of funding, either voluntarily
or involuntarily by the NEA chairperson or peer review panel. This
results in the suppression of "indecent" and "disrespectful"
"excellent" art worth funding. Ultimately, artists may self-censor
their work to obtain funding that hopefully fits within the subjective
Decency Clause guidelines.
The Decency Clause fails to give a workable guideline for
artists or the NEA due to its vague language. The artists' potential to
228 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
229 Brooklyn Institute ofArts and Sciences, LEXIS 16709 at *38.
230 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88.
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self-censor and the NEA's inability to judge based solely on
"excellence," will result in a loss of a full-spectrum of "excellent" art
that accurately reflects the diversity of our culture.
In recent years, the "culture wars" have plagued the public
support of the NEA both financially and politically. Consequently,
these factors have adversely affected artists who have had their NEA
grants reduced over the last few years.23' The NEA, a vital agency,
financially supports artists and related organizations to help bring
America's cultural expression in the arts to the forefront of the world,
and thus should continue to exist.
In addition to achieving aesthetically "excellent" art works,
there are many other reasons to support the NEA as well as other arts
organizations. Economically, the NEA costs less than 0.02 percent of
the annual federal budget. 232 This small investment reaps substantial
benefits in a variety of areas. For example, federal funding for the arts
helps attract tourists, stimulate business, as well as improves the
quality of our lives.
233
The power of the arts is not simply to provide pleasant
esthetics but to help us move forward as a democracy.
Human expression, as conveyed through the arts,
enables us to better understand the complexities of life
and gives us a bridge to the world preceding and
surrounding us.23
Exposure to a variety of cultural traditions enriches not only
our lives but also the generations to come. One may consider public
support for the arts as a down payment on our future. 235 "It is an
investment in the values we claim to honor and in the cultural
231 See C. Carr, Reeling From A Major Funding Drought, Vanguard
Performing Artists Downsize Their Dreams, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 28, 1999, at 39
(illustrating that a variety of artists struggle to survive economically through continuing
financial deterioration of NEA grants).
232 See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Government Funding of the Arts Should
Continue, in CENSORSHIP: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 58, 59 (David Bender and Bruno Leone,
et al. eds., 1997).
233 See id.
234 Id.
235 See id.
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traditions in which democracy has flourished for over 218 years. Now
is no time to turn our backs on that legacy or its promise. '236
B. Recap
With regards to the Finley decision, there are two very
important points to remember: first, the Supreme Court has, for the
first time, stated that the First Amendment places limits on the
government even when it acts as patron.237 Second, in interpreting the
Decency Clause, Justice O'Connor said that under the First
Amendment, awards to artists whose work might be considered
"indecent or disrespectful" could not be discriminated against.238 The
decision was neither a victory for artists nor the government. The
Supreme Court has produced an artful decision which "indecently"
fails to provide a workable guideline for artists and the NEA.
Unfortunately, the result of this decision will be continuing litigation
between the arts and the government.
Barry J. Heyman
236 See Clinton, supra note 232, at 60.
237 See Finley, 524 U.S. at .587 ("If the NEA were to leverage its power to
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